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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RUSSELL S. SCHOW and
DORIS SCHOW, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
-YS.-

Case
No.10546

GUARDTONE, INC., et al,
Defendants and Respondents.

Brief of Respondent Prudential
Federal Savings and Loan Association
Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association
will be referred to herein as ''Prudential.''
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
In this action appellants seek the cancellation of a

a Home Modernization Contract on the ground of fraud.
Prudential seeks recovery against appellants on said
contract for the balance claimed to be due and owing
thereon, plus attorney's fees and costs.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury and submitted on special interrogatories. Some of the interrogatories were
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answered favorably and some adversely to Prudential.
The
court granted judgment notwithstanding the verd'ict
.
m favor of Prudential and against the appellants for
$871.99 and $300.00 attorney's fees and costs.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Prudential seeks to have the judgment in the lower
court affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants' statement of facts is incomplete, argu.
mentative and not supported by reference to the record. Consequently Prudential submits its own state.
ment of facts.
On or about September 8, 1962, appellants were contacted by a man by the name of Albert J. Hughes (R.
212) who spent some four hours with them during which
time he showed a film strip and made a sales presentation with reference to an Intercom and Fire Alarm Sys·
tern (R. 218). While Mr. Hughes was there the contract
(Ex. 1), the Home Modernization Contract (Ex. 11), th0
Bonus Appointment Guarantee and Second Bonus Appointment Guarantee (Ex. 5) and the Advertising
Agreement (Ex. 6) were executed. During the following
week the equipment was installed (R. 227). Following
installation of the equipment, the Borower's Completion
Statement (Ex. 12) was executed by Mr. Schow. Guard·
tone Inc. assigned the Home Modernization Contract
'
'
.l
to Prudential Ex. 11 and Ex. 12) and Prudential paw
2

Guardtone, Inc. therefor. (Ex. 17 and Ex. 18) Before
purchasing the contract a representative of Prudential
talked with Mrs. Schow on the telephone and was advisea by her that the Schows were happy with the unit
and kne'v they were to make payments to Prudential
regardless of the referral program. (Ex. 16, R. 311)
Prudential sent a coupon book to appellants along with
" Loan Completion Questionnaire (Exhibit 13), in which
appellants were advised that Prudential had purchased
their contract. Thereafter appellants made six payments
to Prudential as provided for in the contract (R. 254)
Appellants ceased making payments to Prudential, not
because of any complaint against Prudential but because they claim the ''Guard tone people had not lived up
to their contract.'' (R. 255)
1

ARGUMENT
POINT NO. 1
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE
VERDICT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED.
The court granted motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that the evidence
failed to show that at the time of the transactions the
def end ants fraudulently intended not to perform their
agreements. (R. 178)

In support of their contention that Guardtone never
intended to perform, appellants call attention to the
rhange of the Guardtone telephone number; that its telephone was disconnected; that its salesman failed to keep
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appointments; that Hughes, the salesman who sold the
equipment to appellants disappeared, could not be served
with summons and did not appear at the trial; and finally
that no payments were made to them for referrals.
The foregoing circumstances indicate nothing more
than a failure to perform, which this court has held to he
insufficient to show a preconceived intention not to perform (see cases cited below). However, were it admitted
that such circumstances support a preconceived intention not to perform, appellants cannot escape their
own admissions that no such intention, in fact, existed.
Appellants understood they were obligated to make the
payments in the purchase contract to Prudential (R.
244-245-253). Appellants admitted they had been ref erred to Guard tone by Cecil Chamberlain and that he
was paid $100.00 for such referral. (R. 261) Appellants
knew that at least two or three persons included in the
list of names furnished by them had been contacted by
salesmen of Guardtone. (R. 262) Instead of indicating
an intent not to perform, the admissions of appellants
show part performance.
This court has repeatedly held that a preconcenved
intent not to perform is not established by proof of
failure to perform. (Hull v. Flinders, 83 Utah 158, 27 P.
2d 56; Nielson v. Leamington Mines & Exploration Corporation Corportion, 87 Utah 69, 48 P. 2d 439; Fleming
v. Fleming-Felt Company, 7 Utah 2d 293, 323 P. 2d 712.\
The lower court in granting the motions followed
what appears to be the universal rule that fraud muBt
4

be proved by clear and convincing evidence. (Kelly v. Salt
Lake Tr(]Jrtsportation Comp(]Jrty, 100 Utah 436, 116 P. 2d
383: Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp. v. Sohm, 15 Utah 2d
262, 391 P. 2d 293; Fleming v. Fleming-Felt Company,
7 Utah 2d, 293, 323 P. 2d 712.)

In the Fleming case supra, this court said:

"In respect to the issue of fraud we are constrained to agree with the defendants that the
trial court was in error. One of its essential elements is the knowing false representation, of a
presently existing material fact, which must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence.''
The presumption of the law is against fraud and in
favor of honesty as is borne out by a statement from 51
A. L. R. 166 cited by appellants:

'' * * • A wide latitude should be allowed as to
the intrduction of evidence on the question, but the
facts which show the intention not to perform
the promises must be clear and unquestioned, and
courts of chancery will indulge no presumption
or surmises of fraud. The presumption is that a
person ma.king a representation as to what he expects or hopes is about to take place, in order to
induce action on the part of the person to whom
it is made, acts honestly, however extravagant
such hopes may be. • • •" (Scott v. Empire Land
Co. 1925; D. C.; 5 F. 2d 873, Kley v. Healy (1896),
149 N. Y. 346, 44 N.E. 150).

It is most difficult to conceive of any logical reason
for the contention of appellants that Hughes and the
companies he represented had no intention to contact the
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referrals given them by appellants. Certainly the most
lucrative source of prospects for sales was from referrals.
Why shouldn't they be contacted~ There must be areason other than a supposed fraudulent intent, as the appellants would have this court believe. The real reason
is found in a statement of Mr. Schow. He said, "If
Guardtone had stayed in business we would have been
retired.'' (R. 254) Something went wrong. Guardtone
failed to stay in business. Failure of Guardtone to stay
in business was the reason for not contacting people ref erred by appellants, but such failure is not evidence of
a fraudulent intent not to contact them.
In addition to the ground upon which the court based
its ruling, the motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict in favor of Prudential was properly granted on
the ground that the evidence shows that appellants had
no right to rely on the representations to avoid liability
on the purchase contract.
This court stated in Johnson v. Allen, 108 Utah 148,
158 p. 2d 134, 137 :

'' • • • It is fundamental that before anyone can
have relief from a claimed fraud he must show not
only that he relied on the misrepresentation but
also that he had the right to rely on it. * * •"
Appellants had no right to rely upon the claimed representations to defeat liability on the purchase contract.
The contract (Ex. 1) contains the following provision:
"It is further understood and agreed that payment of compensation set forth in the Represen-
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tative 's Commission Agreement or in the Bonus
Appointment Guarantee shall not in any way affect the obligation of the purchaser as set forth
by the terms and conditions of the contract for
the purchase of equipment herein referred to."
Paragraph 6 of the Bonus Appointment Guarantee, and
of the Second Bonus Appointment Guarantee (Ex. 5)
provides:

''It is further understood and agreed that this

guarantee shall not affect, in any way, the purchase contract which equipment-owning representative has signed for the purchase of the Inter
Comm. F. M. & A. M. Radio and fire alarm
system.''
Paragraph 5 of the Advertising Agreement (Ex. 6) provides as follows :
''This agreement, for compensation 8S a result of
services rendered hereunder, is entered into subsequent to and separate and apart from, and does
not affeet and is not affected by any contracts
for purchase of merchandise, goods and services."
Mr. Schow testified that he read, believed and understood Exhibits "5" and "6," and particularly the quoted
provisions therefrom. (R. 252) He also said that the
instruments "were the most important part" in causing him to sign the contract for the purchase of the
equipment. (R. 248) The agreements to pay for referrals upon which appellants rely are contained in Exhibits
'' 5" and "6." These exhibits also contain the quoted
provisions to the effect that the guarantee with respect
to referrals ·would in no way affect the purchase contract
7

by which appellants became obligated to pay for the
equipment. It has been held that there is no fraud in a
promissory representation which is plainly contradicted
by the stipulations of a binding written contract, (Northrop v. Piper, 271 N.W. 487 (Minn.)). Nor can there be
fraud where the contract upon which appellants rely for
the payment of referrals contains provisions which insulate the referral program from the obligations with
respect to the purchase of the equipment, and where thl'
contract precludes matters regarding the referral program from being asserted by way of defense to liability
on the purchase contract. Such being the case, app€llants
had no right to rely on any representations with respect
to the referral program to avoid liability on the purchase
contract.
The circumstances relied upon by appellants failed
to meet the high standard required by law for the proof
of fraud. Their admissions preclude a finding of fraudulent intent. They had no right to rely upon the claimed
representations to avoid liability on the purchase contract. The court did not err in entering judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SEPARATING THE APPELLANTS' CLAIMS FOR
TRIAL AND EXCLUDING PROFFERED
EVIDENCE OF OTHER ALLEGED FRA-CD·
ULENT PROMISES AND NON-PERFOmfANCE.
8

In support of the foregoing Point II, Prudential

adopts the argument of respondent Guardtone, Inc., contained in Point 2 of its brief and respectfully requests
the court to consider the same as though it were set forth
herein.
POINT NO. III
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT APPELLANTS ARE INDEBTED
TO PRUDENTIAL ON THE CONTRACT
SUED UPON.
The Court submitted to the jury the question of
whether appellants, by their dealings with Prudential, had
elected to treat Prudential as the assignee, owner and
payee of the contract in question. The jury's answer was
"Yes." (R. 154, 155)
The finding of the jury is amply supported by the
evidence. Mr. Schow signed a statement addressed to
Prudential to the effect that the materials and/or work
described in the Home Modernization Contract dated
September 12, 1962, had been delivered and completed to
his satisfaction. (Ex. 12) Appellants were advised, in
wTiting, by Prudential that it had purchased their Home
Improvement Note. (Ex. 13) Thereafter appellants made
six payments of $29.40 each to Prudential as provided for
in the contract. ( R. 254) Appellants received a coupon
book from Prudential. Mrs. Schow advised Prudential
that ''Our name on our coupon payment book was spelled
wrong." (Ex. 13) (Emphasis ours.) Mrs. Schow had
three telephone conversations with someone at Pruden-
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tial, two with reference to the installation of the eqU!p·
ment and one in connection with Ex. 13. (R. 281) Mr.
Schow said at one time he knew there were two Guard.
tone Companies involved but thought they were connected with each other in some way. (R. 246) At onther time
he testified that, so far as he was concerned, "Guard tone.,
was one concern, (R. 258) and, when asked whether it
said "Gua.rdtone of Utah" or "Guardtone, Inc." would
have made any difference to him, he said, "It could do··
- "It might do" but admitted that "Guardtone" was the
represented company and that was all he was concerned
about. (R. 258)
Appellants argue that when a person sues on an assigned claim the obligor is entitled to the protection of
being assured that payment to the assignee will discharge
the obligation. Authorities cited by appellants are based
upon this principle. The Court in Brown v. Esposito, 15i
Pa. Supra 147, 42 At. 2d. 193, cited by appellants, state8,
''This protection must be afforded tlie defendant; otherwise the defendant might find himself subjected to the
same liability to the original owner of the cause of action
in the event there was no actual assignment.'' We are
in accord with the argument of appellants and statements of the Pennsylvania Court but respectfully urge
that appellants have such protection in this case. Guard·
tone of Utah and Guardtone, Inc., are parties in this
action, have been served with process and are subject to
the order of the Court. Neither has asserted ownership of, or a claim on the contract herein sued upon. They
are both bound by the judgment of this Court to the effect
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that Prudential is the owner of the contract. Appellants
cited Section 25-1-8 of the Utah Code Annotated 1953.
A mere reading of this section leads but to one conclusion
-that it has no bearing on the question at hand.
The jury found that the appellants elected to treat
Prudential as the assignee, owner and payee of the contract in question. Such finding is not only supported by
the evidence but, so far as we are aware, there is no evidence to the contrary. Appellants are protected against
any elaim on the contract in question being asserted by
Guardtone of Utah and Guardtone, Inc. Such being true,
the Court did not err in holding that appellants are obligated to Prudential on the contract herein sued upon.

11

CONCLUSION
Prudential was not involved in the sale of merchan.
dise to appellants. Prudential is in the finance business
and as a financing institution purchased from respondent
Guardtone, Inc., a contract executed by appellants in
which they obligated themselves to pay Prudential.
The evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support
the verdict of the jury insofar as it is adverse to Prudential. Before purchasing the contract, Prudential made
inquiry of the appellants and was advised that they wm
happy with the unit and understood they were to pay
Prudential regardless of the ref err al program. Thr
judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of Prudential should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
HAROLD R. BOYER
of ROMNEY & BOYER
1409 Walker Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
.Attorneys for DefendantRespondent
Prudential Federal Savings
and Loan .Association
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